The founders' own record of what actually happened: the capital we put back, the personal debt we took on to put back more, and the distressed-debt playbook used against a company that was still paying. Every figure links to its source. Read it, and decide for yourself.
The founders took their money out and let the company die.
§ IWhat we put back
We put in our own money, and the credit we guaranteed went into the company.
our money in the loan · Block 1 the loan · Block 2
When the company was under pressure, we didn't take money out. We put ours in: ₹5,379 cr (about $648 million) of tax-paid earnings, equity we subscribed, personal loans against our own shares, and mutual funds we liquidated to clear the company's debts. We bet on this company again and again, because we believed in it, and because the mission, the employees, the students, and the parents' trust had to be kept alive. Twenty-five ledger lines, six chapters, each one supported by the document that proves it.
Money we put in as director loans sits on the ICICI and HDFC statements (one December transfer cleared via Kotak). Our debt, raised from those who believed in us, sits on the HSBC statements. The AESL and Manipal facilities were unlocked by our personal guarantees and pledged shares. The Series-F equity is on the MCA record. Names. Dates. Amounts. Here we present what everyone who accused us already knew.
Why it mattersWe were accused of siphoning funds. We did the exact opposite. We put everything we made, and more, back into the business: to keep the mission alive, our employees paid, and our students learning on the product they love.
₹3,749 crBusiness loans & debt we cleared personally
₹750 crEquity we subscribed
₹722 crBorrowed in Dubai
₹158 crSettlements we paid (BCCI)
Our own, made in secondaries (proceeds from selling investments we held), and the debt facilities unlocked by share pledges: director loans and guaranteed facilities, the equity we subscribed, the settlements we paid, and what we borrowed in Dubai against our shares.
Figure 1The composition, at a glance.
Where the ₹5,379 cr came from.
Chapter 6 is shown net of a ₹717.9 cr overlap with Chapter 2: the same money, counted once. That ₹717.9 cr is our securities liquidated to clear three NBFC loans (settled at Deutsche ₹210 cr, Infina ₹350 cr, Nuvama ₹150 cr; AUP-exact principal ₹709.99 cr) plus interest, stamp duty and fees, per the independent agreed-upon-procedures report, an outside firm tracing named transactions against the bank records, short of a full audit opinion (Appendix 7). The separate Nuvama-K3 ₹100 cr was outside that report's scope and is not part of this overlap. However you cut it, the money moved one way: into the company.
How control was lost
How a paying company lost control.
Through 2022 we paid more than $130 million in interest, principal and fees on the $1.2 billion loan, while it was being sold on and we were renegotiating it in good faith. The buyers were distressed-debt investors, funds whose playbook, well understood in the market, is not to be repaid but to force a default and take the asset. What began as a covenant dispute, a dispute over the loan's paperwork promises, became a fight for control of the company.
We believe this crisis was engineered. We are not asking you to take that on faith. The pattern, and the documents, are below.
§ IIWhere the loan went
Every dollar of the loan is accounted for.
This is the other story: the loan the media reported about. It was borrowed with full board approval. The facility is a Term Loan B (one large institutional loan, paid interest-only and then repaid in full at maturity), upsized to $1.2 billion, arranged by Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan on a five-year tenor maturing in November 2026. It was drawn through Byju's Alpha, a Delaware financing subsidiary created for it; the agreement itself is in the evidence locker (EF1). The entire flow sits on the banks' own ledgers, the same records the lenders' side held and later handed over, and the that carried them is in the record. We account for the full $1.2 billion, not just the $533 million the press wrote about: two blocks, that $533 million and the other $666.1 million ($636.1M direct disbursements + $30M arranger economics, the arranging banks' fees).
Block 1The $533M Camshaft trail
“$533 million went missing.” It didn't. Here is exactly where every dollar went, traced wire by wire on the banks' own ledgers, most of it landing back inside the company as equity. We always said the money went into the business. This is the record of where.
Follow the money down the chain. $533 million leaves Byju's Alpha and moves through Camshaft, OCI, Revere and the Singapore entities. $490 million lands as paid-in equity (cash put in for newly issued shares, which lifts the company's capital) at Think and Learn in India. The bank's own memo on every share-purchase wire reads “PURCHASE OF SHARES OF THINK AND LEARN PVT LTD UNDER AUTOMATIC ROUTE.” The financial structure was designed by JPMorgan and Morgan Stanley (EF1).
Figure 2The $533 million trail. $490 million arrives as paid-in equity.
The trail is complete. The correction never reached the coverage: when the accusers finally subpoenaed the HSBC ledgers in 2025, the ledgers confirmed where every dollar had gone. What broke first was a reporting covenant, not a missed payment: a September 2022 deadline to file Think and Learn's audited results for the year ended 31 March 2022 slipped, and the lenders, advised by Houlihan Lokey, moved to amend the covenants. (Bloomberg, 13 Dec 2022.) The loan changed hands at the same time, slumping to as low as 64.5 cents on the dollar that September as primary holders sold to distressed funds. We serviced the loan through 2022: the GLAS ledger shows interest and principal serviced through 29 Dec 2022, $100.2M across ten payments (E03, December statement p.26); with the Term Loan B fees, $130.2M in all. Enforcement began on 3 Mar 2023 (Decl. para. 65); the set-off letter formalising Think and Learn's pre-existing debt to OCI (a 16 Nov 2021 agreement) is dated 15 Mar 2023, two weeks after enforcement began. The founder capital that went in through 2023-24 paid payroll, vendors and students, keeping the company alive while the loan was litigated. It was never going to cure a reporting default the new holders had already moved to accelerate.
Block 2The $636.1M direct disbursements
The other $636.1 million went straight from Alpha's JPMorgan and Silicon Valley Bank accounts to the company's own subsidiaries and to the loan's costs. (A further $30M in arranger economics was netted at funding, taken out before the money arrived; see .) The loan's terms allow exactly this. Working capital. Investments. Marketing. Every wire is on the bank statements.
To group subsidiaries
$430M
$370M across 102 wires to eight named subsidiaries, plus the $60.3M December 2021 draw (recorded before the served statements begin).
GLAS debt service
$100.2M
10 GLAS interest and principal payments on the Alpha JPMorgan statements (E03).
Vendors and expenses
$105.5M
Marketing ($83.8M: FIFA/UBS $65.5M + others), legal ($6.5M) and investments ($15.2M). All incurred by the borrower.
Every wire to the eight subsidiaries:
Block 2 reconciles line by line against the Alpha JPMorgan (E03) and Silicon Valley Bank (E04) statements. The $30M in arranger economics ($12M arrangement fee + $18M original issue discount) was netted at funding in Nov 2021 and does not appear on the 2022 statements; it is shown separately against EF1.
$533M + $636.1M in direct disbursements + $30M arranger economics = ≈ $1.2B. Accounted for, document by document.
§ IIIThe clippings file
The headlines that built the narrative. Answered.
Four years of reporting, pinned to the wall and stamped with what the record actually shows. Open any clipping for the answer and the document behind it.
§ IVMethod
How to verify any number here.
Three categories, one colour each, every number tied to the document that proves it. Every figure in the ledger is a documented number, not an estimate or a guess: every entry is either matched to a bank record (the ✓ tier) or traced to a named source and marked (the ⊙ tier).
“The curious ones cannot be fooled.”
✓ Matched exactly
The bank statement, or the cell in HSBC's own ledger, matches the amount and the date to the dollar. Checked, then checked again.
⊙ Traced to source
A few figures have a known, named source that sits inside a larger file. They are shown plainly and never dressed up as more than they are.
Read it yourself
Every number points to a document, a page or a row, so you can go straight from the claim to the line that proves it.
E01 · Row 34 → “PURCHASE OF SHARES OF THINK AND LEARN PVT LTD”
What we leave out
If a wire could not be matched to its source, we left it out. This record holds only what we can put in front of you.
The colour system
§ VZero ambiguity
Every wire, on one ledger.
Here is every wire we traced, on one ledger. Filter by category, search any name, sort any column. Every row carries its proof right beside it: open it inline and read the source, with no waiting.
The master ledger: every wire, sortable and filterable. Each row is backed by a source document in the evidence locker.
Exhibit
Every ledger line on its own row; each row's proof opens inline, right where you are. Zero ambiguity, row by row.
§ VIThe evidence locker
The source documents.
The bank statements, ledgers and contracts behind every number. Open any one and read the real thing.
The fuller filings, our own accounting and the supporting documents, are public record. They are where every number here comes from.
“Headlines shape a news cycle. The record is the record.”
We did everything we could for this company, and then it was taken by a playbook built to take it. What we actually did is on this page, wire by wire. Judge for yourself.
Published by the founders of BYJU’S · 2026
The Byju's Financial Recordmaintained by the foundersFound an error? records@byjubilliondollartruth.com · corrections are logged and dated2026